This article argues that international regime complexity has shaped Europe's politics of human rights trade conditionality by creating opportunities for various types of "forum shopping," and, consequently, that some of the most significant politics of human rights enforcement have occurred in an entirely separate issue area -trade -which are being worked out partly during lawmaking and partly during implementation. The presence of nested and overlapping institutions creates incentives for rival political actors -whether states, institutions, or policymakers -to (1) forum shop for more power, (2) advantage themselves in the context of a parallel or overlapping regime, and (3) invoke institutions 'a la carte' to govern a specific issue but not others. Each tactic creates competition between institutions and actors for authority over the rules, setting hurdles for IO performance. Even so, (4) regime complexity can make enforcement of rules that are impossible to implement in one area possible in another area. 1 The author is grateful to the participants of this symposium for their helpful comments, and to Nuffield College at Oxford University and Princeton University for financial support during the completion of this project.
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The European Union (EU) is transforming the politics of repression worldwide by pushing its human rights agenda one state at a time in an entirely separate issue area -through the use of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with overlapping commitments to protect human rights. The EU's Partnership Agreement with members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states (ACP), for instance, makes respect for human rights "essential elements" of the trade agreement; so does their Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Kazakhstan, and a considerable number of other countries. More agreements are in the process of negotiation (Hafner-Burton 2009; Kelly 2004 ). This article argues that international regime complexity has shaped Europe's politics of human rights trade conditionality by creating opportunities for various types of "forum shopping," and, consequently, that some of the most significant politics of human rights enforcement have occurred in an entirely separate issue area -trade -which are being worked out partly during lawmaking and partly during implementation. It is not entirely a rosy account. The presence of nested and overlapping institutions creates incentives for rival political actors -whether states, institutions, or policymakers -to (1) forum shop for more power, (2) advantage themselves in the context of a parallel or overlapping regime, and (3) invoke institutions 'a la carte' to govern a specific issue but not others. Each tactic creates competition between institutions and actors for authority over the rules, setting hurdles for IO performance. Even so, (4) regime complexity can make enforcement of rules that are impossible to implement in one area possible in another area.
The Architecture of Conditionality
Europe negotiates trade rules in an institutional environment populated by many international agreements. Human rights conditions are also made, contested, and implemented in an atmosphere characterized by nested and partially overlapping institutions, including both 3 international organizations and treaties ( Figure 1 
Forum Shopping
Europe has a problem: they want to protect their citizens from the ills associated with globalization, and they have long been pushing for the protection of human rights worldwide as a solution (Alston 1999 The WTO is the focal point for trade. The EU wants trade conditionality in the WTO to enforce the protection of certain human rights, but most other states do not and mobilization against the idea has been considerable. 6 The EU cannot override the majority of WTO members on this issue; however, they can avoid the institution in favor of another set of institutions that
could give them what they want. Nested inside the WTO, PTAs offer many of the same benefits:
They promise wealth and are reasonably enforceable. But they offer the added advantage of more influence, giving Europe greater power to set the rules with developing countries (Hafner- This example hints at another general implication. Lesson 2: Given a set of institutional options, actors will strategically use institutions in which they have more power (such as veto capacity or agenda setting) to boost their authority in another institution.
Facilitating Exit
A third tendency is for actors to use one institution to escape or invalidate a legal obligation in another institution. Regime complexity makes this 'a la carte' behavior more likely by reducing the clarity of legal obligations and by producing opportunities to forum shop. The European Union has selectively used the VCLT, a treaty accepted as customary law, to shape how human rights conditionality is defined and used. The European Community has a long history of promoting trade ties with African and Eastern European governments despite their human rights violations. Member states have largely ignored critics who lament that the Community's PTAs give profits to repressive dictators, preferring instead to strengthen ties to their former colonies wherever possible. The Community's inclusion of human rights provisions in PTAs was an 8 anathema to some members of the European Council. Working through Community institutions, member states once appealed to the VCLT to blunt the effects of the human rights provisions.
They invoked the same VCLT legal principle on which they based their right to pursue market influence abroad-pacta sunt servanda: pacts must be respected -and used this as a justification for non-action, arguing that trade agreements must be respected even when trade partners abused human rights.
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Years later the Community would invoke the VCLT for the contrary reason -as a strategy to make conditionality enforceable across all PTAs. This time, the motive was genocide.
In 1991, extreme violence broke out in Yugoslavia. Bound by a trade agreement, the Community faced its neighbor's crisis with no standard legal recourse to pull out from its obligations. for not all Member States supported the principle of suspension without consultations.
Opponents argued that the "Baltic" provisions clashed with a core principle of Community legal order, that all pacts must be respected, and the VCLT was again appealed to. The Council soon after abandoned the "Baltic" clause in favor of a weaker rule that allows suspension of an agreement only as a last resort after all other "appropriate measures" have been taken (Bartels 2005) . The standard language of the Community's clause today reflects this balance, justified partly by consistency with overlapping commitments to international law on treatiescompletely lacking in enforcement.
Lesson 3: International regime complexity allows actors to pick the institution with the weakest enforcement mechanisms, thereby facilitating exit from inconvenient commitments.
Implementation
In the area of human rights linkages to trade, regime complexity makes the binding nature of human rights clauses less clear by introducing many sets of legal rules and jurisdictions. The possibility of shifting to venues with weaker enforcement mechanisms and where human rights conditions are more easily escaped leads to chessboard politics-strategizing by proponents and opponents of human rights linkages to either strengthen or weaken human rights conditionality provisions. This chessboard maneuvering shapes implementation of the rules. On the one hand, the existence of multiple and overlapping institutions makes it easier for pro-human rights actors to enforce human rights rules through linkages to trade agreements. On the other hand, international regime complexity exacerbates the difficulty of implementing the new trade rules, as plenty of actors use other institutions to resist enforcing them.
International regime complexity has allowed the EU to insert human rights conditions into PTAs, and Member States to strip application of these provisions out. complicates the implementation of the rules but it does not necessarily make enforcement unlikely; it could make enforcement more likely.
Conclusion
Europe's particular experience with trade conditionality has shaped the politics of human rights protection in profound ways, at times encouraging Europe's repressive trade partners to reforma subject that has been studied in detail elsewhere. 16 It also draws attention to the ways in which nested and overlapping institutions shape actors' political strategies and outcomes -the focus of 11 this symposium. Regime complexity generates opportunities for power politics and political opportunism by creating incentives for rival actors-whether states, institutions, politicians, or NGOs-to choose among institutions that allow them to get what they want, avoiding the rules they do not like in an effort to gain political advantages or using one part of the system to get advantages in another. These politics regularly lead to actions full of contradictions, as actors invoke institutions 'a la carte' to justify their actions and changing or conflicting interests. Even so, complexity can sometimes make possible politics that, in a simpler environment, were impossible -in Europe, this is the story of human rights in foreign policy.
One way to think about how regime complexity matters is to imagine the counterfactual of a world without any one of the existing institutions. Imagine a WTO that is friendly to human rights: If governments had long ago adopted human rights into the global trade regime, the Community probably would never have pursued a regional strategy of enforcement. Resistance to human rights inside the multilateral trade regime exacerbated the problem by exposing the lack of political commitment to human rights, driving pro-human rights actors to search for alternative institutions where linkages between human rights and trade would be possible.
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Imagine no WTO at all: Human rights are linked to trade partly because globalization affects people's welfare and partly because trade institutions have stronger enforcement mechanisms than most of the human rights regime. Without the global trade regime, it is unlikely today that human rights would be thought of as issues for trade regulation at all.
Imagine that PTAs did not exist: The Community would probably have found another way to impose conditionality. In fact, they have simultaneously pursued alternative institutions in their General System of Preferences (GSP) and various unilateral financial and aid instruments.
Imagine a more authoritative global human rights regime: If UN human rights institutions were more effective in ensuring compliance or in establishing authority over commerce, the Community might never have turned to trade policy to begin with.
Imagine no global human rights regime at all: While UN Human Rights regimes are largely unable to enforce human rights treaties, UN treaties define which rights are important, and they create legal obligations to respect and to protect human rights. The existence of the global human rights regime makes linking trade to human rights standards possible. Indeed it is hard to imagine that human rights would be major issues for policy regulation in other arenas, such as trade, were it not for the existence of global human rights regimes.
Lastly, imagine no VCLT: Would outcomes be fundamentally different? The VCLT has shaped the language enforcement; without the Convention the "essential elements" clause would certainly be different. But this may be a matter of convenience. Without the VCLT, strategic opponents within the Community would probably have found another set of institutions in which to embed their resistance to suspension of trade agreements -here, power politics rules.
